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TITLE VII, TITLE IX, OR BOTH? 
Kendyl L. Green* 
Currently, there is a circuit split regarding whether to apply Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, or both, when an individual alleges discrimination and is an 
employee and a student at a federally funded institution.  After the recent 
case, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the First, Third, and Fourth 
Circuits correctly held that both Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 apply, but the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits found Title VII to preempt Title IX.  Title IX varies 
considerably from Title VII.  Title IX does not require a claimant to 
exhaust the administrative remedies first and there is no damages cap.  
Also, if a violation of Title IX is found, federal agencies have a right to 
withdraw federal funding to the educational institution. Therefore, an 
individual should not be denied the right to bring an independent claim 
under both statutes.  In order to end the circuit split, the Supreme Court 
of the United States should resolve the issue by allowing a plaintiff to bring 
a discrimination claim with employment and educational attributes under 
both Title VII and Title IX. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine working on your medical residency and being sexually 
harassed by the director of the residency program at a federally funded 
hospital.  In this situation, you are both an employee of the hospital and a 
student completing your education.  Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (Title VII) apply, does Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 (Title IX) apply, or do both apply?1 
Many individuals bring only Title IX claims because they hope to 
surpass Title VII.2 Title VII was created with more of a compensatory 
purpose in mind, whereas Title IX was created with the goal to prevent 
federal funding of discriminatory institutions.3  Title VII contains “an 
express cause of action, provides for [specific] compensatory damages, 
and does not rely on a contractual framework.”4  Title VII also requires an 
individual to exhaust all the administrative remedies in an administrative 
forum first before seeking judicial relief.5  Conversely, Title IX does not 
require a claimant to exhaust the administrative remedies first, there is no 
damages cap, and if a violation of Title IX is found, federal agencies have 
a right to withdraw their federal funding to the educational institution.6  
For many years, there has been a circuit split on this issue.7  The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits held that Title VII provides the 
exclusive remedy for employees alleging discrimination on the basis of 
sex in federally funded educational institutions.8  However, the First, 
Fourth, and Third Circuits found that Title IX rights were deemed 
independent of and not preempted by Title VII.9 
In Part II, Title VII and Title IX are examined.  Section “a” discusses 
Title VII, Section “b” analyzes Title IX, and Section “c” explains the 
differences between the statutes.  In Part III, the circuit split is depicted 
through the Fifth and Seventh Circuit’s Lakoski v. James and Waid v. 
                                                                                                                         
 1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 2 See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996); Lakoski v. James, 
66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 3 Hayley Macon, Lisa Mottet, Julia Mujal, & Lara Cartwright-Smith, Introduction to 
Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 424 (2000). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751. 
 6 See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017).  The ability 
for a federal agency to withdraw their funding under Title IX is seen as a contract.  It is 
understood from the statute that when an educational institution accepts federal funding, 
any violation of Title IX will result in a loss of the funding. 
 7 See Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751; Preston v. Com. of Va. Ex Rel. 
New River Com. Col., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 
F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 8 Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751. 
 9 Doe, 850 F.3d at 545; Preston, 31 F.3d at 203; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881. 
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Merrill Area Pub. Schs., as well as the First, Third and Fourth Circuit’s 
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical 
Center, and Preston v. Com. of Va. ex rel. New River Com. Col.10  Finally, 
Part IV is the conclusion, which discusses the issue and where the courts 
should go from here. 
II. TITLE VII AND TITLE IX GENERALLY 
Title VII and Title IX are laws used to combat discrimination.11  Title 
VII protects individuals in the workplace and Title IX covers educational 
activities and institutions.12  Below, is a discussion of both Title VII and 
Title IX in the context of this circuit split. 
A. Title VII History and Rule of Law 
Title VII, or 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, was introduced following racial 
oppression and discrimination.13  Because skilled African Americans 
threatened the economic well-being of Caucasians, many regulations, 
including “Black Codes,” were implemented to eliminate opportunities for 
African Americans to use their skills or acquire new ones.14  Even as late 
as 1961, African Americans were trained for jobs that were specifically 
regulated for a segregated employment market.15  The purpose of Title VII 
is to “achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers 
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees.”16  Specifically, Section 703 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which is amended by Section 107 in 1991, states, “an 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice.”17 
To further reinforce the purpose of Title VII, the Supreme Court in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. declared that the objective was to achieve equal 
employment opportunities by eliminating barriers that favor white 
                                                                                                                         
 10 Doe, 850 F.3d at 545; Waid, 91 F.3d at 857; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751; Preston, 31 
F.3d at 203; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881. 
 11 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Julius L. Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII: The Continuing Challenge of 
Establishing Fair Employment Practice, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 (1986). 
 14 Id. at 11. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX=?: Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy for 
Employment Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
185, 188 (1996). 
 17 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 
(1991). 
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employees.18 This is known as disparate impact, which occurs if “neutral 
policies or practices ha[ve] a disproportionate, adverse impact on any 
protected class, usually minorities or women,” and that impact cannot be 
justified by a legitimate business consideration.19  Unlike disparate impact, 
disparate treatment is when “an employer impermissibly differentiates 
among employees or applicants based on their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”20  Disparate treatment requires intent, but disparate 
impact does not.21  Under Title VII, “practices, procedures, or tests neutral 
on their face and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if 
they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.”22  Congress directed the thrust of the act “to the consequences 
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”23  Moreover, 
Congress has placed the burden on the employer to show “that any given 
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question.”24  This disparate impact cause of action that the Supreme Court 
established, and which was codified in Title VII, eliminated unnecessary 
non-job-related barriers to equal employment opportunity.25  Congress 
intended “to ensure equal employment opportunities for all people by 
prohibiting policies and practices that are prejudicial to historically 
mistreated groups.”26 
A prerequisite to filing a Title VII claim in federal district court is 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.27  Proceedings can be initiated 
by either “‘a person claiming to be aggrieved’ or by a member of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).”28  A “claimant may 
pursue federal remedies by filing a complaint with the [EEOC].”29  The 
EEOC investigates the claim and “if the EEOC finds reasonable cause to 
believe the complaint is true it must pursue informal efforts to resolve the 
                                                                                                                         
 18 Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 13 at 16. 
 19 Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html. 
 20 Gerald S. Hartman & Richard H. Schnadig, 1 Personnel Handbook 36 (1989). 
 21 See id. 
 22 Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 13 at 16 (internal citation omitted). 
 23 Hartman & Schnadig, supra note 20 at 37 (internal citation omitted). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace Appearance 
Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288 (2008–09). 
 27 See Donald W. Nierling, The Role of Preclusion Rules in Title VII: An Analysis of 
Congressional Intent Notes, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1473 (1986). 
 28 George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 691 (1980) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 29 Nierling, supra note 27 at 1473 (discussing EEOC procedure to investigate Title VII 
claims). 
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complaint.”30  The “investigation of an EEOC charge should be reasonable 
and seek the root source of discrimination.”31 If no resolution is reached, 
the EEOC may bring a civil action to have the court enforce its ruling.32  
“If the EEOC fails to find probable cause to believe the complaint is true 
or decides not to bring an action to enforce its judgment, the EEOC must 
issue a right-to-sue letter, entitling the claimant to bring a civil action in 
federal district court.”33  If the EEOC fails “to resolve the complaint under 
its administrative procedures, or if no action is taken by the EEOC within 
180 days of filing, the individual may bring suit in federal district court.”34 
Alternatively, a person may bring a discrimination claim with a state 
or local authority.35  If an individual is denied relief, he or she may bring 
a claim under Title VII.36  “[T]he Supreme Court held that a state 
administrative finding of non-discrimination does not preclude a Title VII 
suit on the claim where the claimant does not appeal the administrative 
body’s decisions through the state court system.”37  Therefore, in both 
situations, a claimant may bring suit in federal court to obtain damages 
and equitable relief. 
B. Title IX Rule of Law 
Furthermore, Congress enacted Title IX, or 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), as 
a reaction to sex discrimination in educational programs.38  Title IX is 
enforced primarily by the Department of Education’s Office for Civil 
Rights (“OCR”).39  “It was passed as part of the Education Laws in 1972 
after a thorough investigation showed a distinct pattern of sex 
discrimination.”40  Title IX states, “No person in the United States shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”41  The law covers “pre-
school, elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, 
vocational and technical schools, community and junior colleges, and 
                                                                                                                         
 30 Id. 
 31 Bradley M. Jones, The Permissible Scope of Title VII Actions, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 
493, 502 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). 
 32 Nierling, supra note 27 at 1473. 
 33 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 34 Hartman & Schnadig, supra note 20 at 40–41. 
 35 Id. at 41. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012). 
 39 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 417. 
 40 Clark C. Griffith, Comments on Title IX, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 57 (2003). 
 41 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (2012). 
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graduate and professional schools.”42  Furthermore, “Individuals who wish 
to bring a claim under Title IX must prove that they were subjected to 
exclusion from participation in, denial of educational benefits of, or 
discrimination ‘under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.’”43  Three elements to establish jurisdiction under 
Title IX include: “(1) allegations of discrimination based on sex, (2) within 
an education program, (3) which ‘receiv[ed] Federal financial 
assistance.’”44  The second and third issues have raised a number of legal 
issues.45  For example, some individuals argue how broad “an education 
program” may extend and, also, whether being a “[recipient of] Federal 
financial ‘assistance’ means that the presence of a dollar of Federal money 
anywhere  . . .  is sufficient to trigger Title IX jurisdiction.”46  Three 
methods of enforcing Title IX are making an in-house complaint, filing a 
complaint within 180 days of the alleged discrimination with the OCR, or 
pursuing a lawsuit in federal district court.47 
Both public and private enforcement is available to remedy a 
situation.  “Within Title IX, Congress created a public remedy that permits 
the termination of federal funds when an institution providing educational 
programs discriminates against an individual on the basis of sex.”48  Title 
IX is thought of as a contract, where federal agencies agree to fund an 
educational institution so long as the institution does not violate the 
statute.49  If the institution does violate the statute, the agency may revoke 
it’s funding.50  After Title IX’s creation, the Supreme Court created a 
private right of action in Cannon v. University of Chicago.51  In 1992, 
“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court ruled that schools that failed to comply with 
Title IX could be sued for compensatory and punitive damages.”52 
C. Differences Between Title VII and Title IX 
Title VII and Title IX are similar, yet different from each other.  As 
seen in this circuit split, courts have ruled Title VII preempts Title IX.53  
Courts have decided that Title VII guides Title IX claims because it 
                                                                                                                         
 42 Katherine Levitan, Interrogatories, 25 NASSAU LAW 376 (1978). 
 43 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 420. 
 44 Linda Jean Carpenter & R. Vivian Acosta, Title IX- Two for One: A Starter Kit of 
the Law and a Snapshot of Title IX’s Impact, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 504. 
 47 Id. at 505–06. 
 48 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 419. 
 49 See Doe, 850 F.3d at 545. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Id.; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). 
 52 Florencio Ramirez, Title IX, 27 GPSOLO 16, 18 (2010). 
 53 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 423–24. 
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provides case law dictating the prohibition of sex discrimination.54  Unlike 
“Title IX[, which] was enacted to prevent federal funding of 
discriminatory actions pursuant to Congress’s spending power, Title VII 
was enacted with a compensatory scheme in mind.”55  Even though 
individuals employed by educational institutions are covered by the terms 
of Title IX, many claims have been filed under Title VII.56  This is because 
“Title VII contains an express cause of action, provides for [specific] 
compensatory damages, and does not rely on a contractual framework.”57  
On the other hand, certain features make an action under Title IX more 
attractive.  Plaintiffs under Title IX need not exhaust administrative 
remedies or receive a “right to sue” letter from an administrative agency.58  
Also, Title IX damages vary from Title VII’s.  Unlike Title VII, Title IX 
has no damages cap.59  Lastly, federal agencies may withdraw their federal 
funding under Title IX, but this is not the case under Title VII.60  Title IX 
was enacted under the Spending Clause powers, “making it in the nature 
of a contract: In accepting federal funds, States agree to comply with its 
mandate.”61  Therefore, if an entity agrees to accept federal funds for its 
educational program or activity, the federal funds may be revoked if there 
is a violation of Title IX.62  Consequently, advantages and disadvantages 
exist within both statutes, so an individual should not be barred from 
bringing a Title IX claim independently from a Title VII. 
III.  CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING TITLE VII AND TITLE IX IN 
EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS THAT ARE PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS 
For years, there has been a circuit split concerning when an 
individual wanted to bring both a Title VII and Title IX claim.63  The Fifth 
and Seventh Circuits held that Title VII and Title IX claims were not 
independent and Title VII preempted Title IX.64  In March 2017, the Third 
Circuit joined the First and Fourth Circuits in holding that “Title IX rights 
                                                                                                                         
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 424. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 424–25. 
 59 Macon, et al., supra note 3 at 425. 
 60 See Doe, 850 F.3d at 552. 
 61 Id. (explaining that the nature of Title IX is contractual because federal agencies 
may withdraw federal funding if there is a violation). 
 62 Id. 
 63 John P. Barry & Edna D. Guerrasio, Third Circuit Endorses Title IX and Title VII 
Claims of Medical Resident, Publications, PROSKAUER (Mar. 21, 2017), 
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/third-circuit-recognizes-title-ix-and-
title-vii-claims-of-medical-resident/. 
 64 Id. 
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[are] deemed independent of and not preempted by Title VII.”65  Now, the 
issue is ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court.66 
In the Fifth Circuit case, Lakoski v. James, Professor Dr. Joan 
Lakoski, brought a sex discrimination action against the University of 
Texas Medical Branch (“the University”) under Title IX when she was 
denied tenure.67  Dr. Lakoski was hired as a tenure-track assistant 
professor, in the Department of Pharmacology, where she subsequently 
sought and was denied a promotion three times.68  The department’s tenure 
committee recommended that she not be considered for tenure in the 
future.  The departmental chairman informed her that the upcoming 
appointment would be her last.69  Dr. Lakoski sued the University and 
three University officials “alleging that the denial of tenure and her 
termination constituted intentional sex discrimination in violation of Title 
IX[.]”70 
The court held that “Title IX did not provide [the] direct private right 
of action to individuals seeking money damages for alleged sex 
discrimination by federally funded educational institution[s].”71  The court 
explained that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for individuals seeking 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded 
educational institutions.72  The Fifth Circuit emphasized its unwillingness 
to find an implied private right of action for damages under Title IX for 
employment discrimination because “doing so would disrupt a carefully 
balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment discrimination by 
employers” under Title VII.73  The court limited its holding to only 
individuals seeking money damages under Title IX and held that Title IX 
does not offer a remedial bypass of Title VII.74  Therefore, because Ms. 
Lakoski did not bring a Title VII claim, she was precluded from bring a 
Title IX claim.75 
                                                                                                                         
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 751 (discussing claims where Title VII preempts Title IX when 
there is strong Title VII claim). 
 68 Id. at 752. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 751. 
 71 Id. at 758 (explaining Fifth Circuit’s viewpoint that Title VII preempts Title IX when 
there is alleged discrimination for federally funded educational institutions). 
 72 Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753. 
 73 Id. at 754 (describing court’s viewpoint of bringing a claim under Title IX as 
“violence” that would create a disruption to a “carefully balanced remedial scheme”). 
 74 Id. at 754 (discussing Fifth Circuit’s opinion that Title VII preempts Title IX in 
educational employment discrimination cases). 
 75 Id. 
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Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit’s Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 
Tana Waid, a long-term substitute junior high school teacher, alleged 
Merrill Area Public Schools denied her a full-time teaching position 
because of her sex in violation of Title IX.76  After Ms. Waid was 
appointed, a member of the faculty died and Ms. Waid assumed his duties 
for the rest of the school year.77  Subsequently, the school sought a 
permanent replacement for the deceased teacher.78  Ms. Waid applied for 
the position, but Richard Bonnell was hired instead.79 
As a result, Ms. Waid brought an employment discrimination claim 
with a state agency charged with the exclusive power to enforce 
Wisconsin’s fair employment law.80  The agency ruled in her favor and 
granted her all the remedies available under state law.81  However, these 
remedies are not as extensive as those under federal law.82  She sought 
these additional remedies and filed a lawsuit in federal court.83 The federal 
district court concluded that Ms. “Waid’s pursuit of administrative relief 
under state law prevented her from pursuing any of the federal claims.”84  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling and 
believed the legal ground for the ruling was unclear.85  It stated that the 
“essence of the [district court’s] holding seems to be that Waid’s choice of 
a state administrative forum was, in effect, an election of remedies and that 
her success in that forum precluded her pursuit of compensatory and 
punitive damages under federal law in federal court.”86  The decision 
related primarily to issue preclusion and issue preemption.87 
The court recognized that the Wisconsin state law provided a 
statutory right against sex discrimination in employment, which ran 
parallel to the federal statute, Title VII.88  Title VII requires a claimant to 
first seek administrative remedies in an administrative forum before 
pursuing the rights in court.89  The EEOC may provide this administrative 
                                                                                                                         
 76 Waid, 91 F.3d at 857 (holding Title VII preempts Title IX and are dependent claims 
where individuals are in workplace and educational environment). 
 77 Id. at 859. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 860. 
 80 Id. at 859 (state agency is referred to as the Equal Rights Division in this case). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Waid, 91 F.3d at 859. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 759. 
 85 Id. at 860. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. (discussing district court’s decision referencing issue preclusion but appellate 
court believed district court’s reasoning implied claim preclusion too). 
 88 Waid, 91 F.3d at 861. 
 89 Id. 
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forum, but if a state agency stands as the local equivalent, a plaintiff with 
Title VII claims may have to first seek relief from state administrators who 
act under state law.90  Thus, Title VII is a remedy for “victims of 
employment discrimination who cannot obtain complete redress for their 
injuries in an administrative forum, whether the agency providing 
administrative redress is a creature of state or federal government.”91  
Additionally, Title IX provides that an educational institution or activity 
may lose funds provided by federal agencies if there is a violation of Title 
IX.92  The court recognized that Ms. Waid was an employee of an 
educational institution receiving federal funds, which gave her a private 
right of action under Title IX.93 
However, the Seventh Circuit examined “whether Waid’s choice to 
bring claims in a state administrative forum that could not consider Title 
IX claims preclude[d] her from raising those claims in a judicial forum.”94  
The court believed, according to the Second Restatement of Judgments, 
the plaintiff must assert her “claims initially in the forum with the broadest 
possible jurisdiction.”95  If a plaintiff has an unconstrained choice to bring 
all her claims in a forum of limited or broad jurisdiction and she chooses 
the limited venue, this “precludes her from bringing the unlitigated claims 
in a subsequent proceeding.”96  However, the Equal Rights Division’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over Waid’s state claims made it evident that she 
could not have consolidated her claims in a single lawsuit.97  Therefore, 
“the decision of her state administrative proceeding does not [alone] 
preclude her claims arising under federal law.”98  The court further noted 
that “Wisconsin requires that its courts consider a variety of factors when 
determining whether to give issue preclusion effect to the unreviewed 
decision of a state administrative agency.”99 
Those factors include the following: (1) the ability of the party 
against whom preclusion is sought to obtain judicial review of the 
decision; (2) differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures 
followed by the agency and the court; (3) differences in the standards of 
                                                                                                                         
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. (discussing purpose of bringing Title VII claims in federal court). 
 92 Id. at 862. (“The creation of this incentive indicates that Congress intended to place 
the burden of compliance with civil rights law on the educational institutions themselves, 
not on the individual officials associated with those institutions.”). 
 93 Id. at 861. 
 94 Waid, 91 F.3d at 863. 
 95 Id. at 865 (explaining plaintiff must initially bring all claims in broad forum when 
she has a choice). 
 96 Id. at 864–65. 
 97 Id. at 865. 
 98 Id. at 866. 
 99 Id. 
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proof required by the agency and the court; (4) policy considerations that 
would make the application of issue preclusion fundamentally unfair.100 
After the court evaluated these factors, it found that the “Equal 
Rights Division’s factfinding on the issue of discrimination should 
preclude the relitigation of the issue, [whether Ms. Waid was 
discriminated against,] because the school system had the opportunity to 
seek judicial review of the agency’s decision, but it declined to do so.”101  
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit held that the Equal Rights Division’s 
decision precluded the question of whether there was discrimination, but 
not whether it intended to discriminate against Ms. Waid.102  It also 
believed that Congress intended Title VII to be the exclusive way to 
vindicate a right and, therefore, Title VII preempted Title IX.103 
Conversely, in the Fourth Circuit case, Preston v. Com. of Va. ex rel. 
New River Com. Col., Susan Preston, the community college student 
support services counselor, brought action against New River Community 
College alleging that it violated Title VII and Title IX because it retaliated 
against her for filing an employment discrimination claim based on gender 
and race.104  She alleged the college failed to award her the positions of 
counselor for student development and activities counselor due to her 
previous discrimination charge with the EEOC.105  However, a jury had 
concluded that “Preston would not have received the position even if the 
college had not discriminated against her.”106  The Fourth Circuit held that 
the determination by the jury that she would not have been awarded the 
position of activities counselor in the absence of the College’s retaliation 
did not foreclose Preston from being entitled to pursue relief under Title 
IX.107  Subsequently, the court examined “whether [it] should construe 
Title IX as Title VII was construed at the time the events underlying this 
action occurred or whether [it] should construe [Title IX] in accordance 
with the way Title VII has been amended by Congress in the interim.”108  
The Fourth Circuit found that “applying an interpretation of Title IX in 
                                                                                                                         
 100 Waid, 91 F.3d at 866 (declaring Wisconsin rules for determining whether issue 
preclusion should give effect to unreviewed decision of state administrative agency). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 867. 
 103 Id. at 862. This case was abrogated, but is still used for the Title VII and Title IX 
circuit split. 
 104 Preston, 31 F.3d at 203–04 (discussing discrimination claims where Title VII does 
not preempt Title IX because the claims are independent). 
 105 Id. (discussing alleged retaliatory discrimination when College failed to hire Ms. 
Preston because of her previous discrimination claims). 
 106 Id. at 205. 
 107 Id. at 208–09. 
 108 Id. at 207 (discussing whether Title IX should be construed according to VII at the 
time of the events or by the way Title VII has been amended by Congress in interim). 
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accordance with Title VII as amended by the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] 
(“CRA”) to conduct occurring before the effective date of the amendment 
would amount to an impermissible retroactive application.”109  Therefore, 
even though there was not a settled interpretation by the Supreme Court at 
the time the conduct occurred, the court of appeals believed that a Title IX 
employment discrimination claim should be interpreted in accordance 
with the principles governing Title VII.110  However, the court noted that 
these claims are still independent from each other.111  Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that since Ms. Preston would not have received the 
position of activities counselor even if she had not filed the discrimination 
claim in 1984, the college did not ultimately violate Title IX.112 
Additionally, in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, the First Circuit 
found that Annabelle Lipsett, a resident in the General Surgery Residency 
Training Program, made a prima facie case of hostile work environment, 
quid pro quo sexual harassment, and discriminatory discharge.113  The 
residency program integrated the surgical training programs of San Juan 
Veterans Administration Hospital and the Hospital at the University of 
Puerto Rico.114  Ms. Lipsett claimed “that the predominant professional 
view of surgery [was]  . . .  a medical field appropriate only for men[, 
which] made it difficult, and at times impossible, for her to gain 
acceptance and respect in the [p]rogram.”115  Also, the residents made 
sexual comments towards Ms. Lipsett, and nicknamed her “Selastraga,” 
meaning “she swallows them.”116  Two supervisory residents filed 
complaints against Ms. Lipsett, accusing her of admitting patients to her 
ward without first consulting the senior resident, creating friction among 
the residents, failing to inform her superiors of the results of analyses 
performed on patients, being late, and having unauthorized absences.117  
Shortly after, Ms. Lipsett was dismissed from the program.118 
The First Circuit analyzed whether “the Title VII standard [of 
disparate treatment, which proves discrimination,]  . . .  should apply as 
                                                                                                                         
 109 Id. at 208. 
 110 Preston, 31 F.3d at 206. 
 111 Id. at 205 (holding Title IX is independent from Title VII and Title VII does not 
preempt Title IX). 
 112 Id. at 208. 
 113 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881. 
 114 Id. at 886. This case discusses the court’s decision that Title VII does not preempt 
Title IX. The court found the claims to be independent. 
 115 Id. (illustrating sex discrimination under Title VII and Title IX when women were 
treated inferior and threatened with dismissal). 
 116 Id. at 888 (discussing sexual harassment and hostile work environment under Title 
VII and Title IX when Ms. Lipsett was sexually harassed during her residency). 
 117 Id. at 891. 
 118 Id. at 892. 
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well to claims of sex discrimination arising under Title IX.”119 The court 
agreed with the Tenth Circuit that since “‘Title VII prohibits the identical 
conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination,’ it would regard 
Title VII ‘as the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX’s 
substantive standards.’”120 Therefore, Title VII case law may be used for 
Title IX claims.121 A prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment under 
Title IX consists of a showing that “(1) [the plaintiff] was subject to 
unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor or teacher and (2) that his or 
her reaction to these advances affected tangible aspects of his or her 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or 
educational training.”122  Additionally, to make out a prima facie case of 
hostile environment, the plaintiff must show that he or she was subjected 
to unwelcome sexual advances “sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive’ that 
[they] altered his or her working or educational environment.”123 To have 
a cause of action for sexual harassment under Title IX, “an educational 
institution is liable upon a finding of hostile environment sexual 
harassment perpetrated by its supervisors upon employees if an official 
representing that institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have known, of the harassment’s occurrence, unless that official 
can show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it.”124 
The First Circuit found that surgery residents, who were not named 
as defendants, committed most, if not all, of the alleged acts of harassment 
and discrimination.125  Consequently, the court examined to what extent 
may the named defendants be held liable for the acts of others under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.126  The First Circuit rejected the district court’s finding that 
no affirmative link existed among the participants in the alleged 
wrongdoing and the defendants who did not partake in the incident.127  
First, the doctors’ failure to “investigate and put a stop to the harassment 
directed against the plaintiff[,] constituted ‘gross negligence amounting to 
                                                                                                                         
 119 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 897 (discussing their reliance on the EEOC’s guideline called the “Procedures 
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 122 Id. at 898. 
 123 Id. 
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 125 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 899. 
 126 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 127 Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902. 
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deliberate indifference.’”128  Second, it found “that the complaints directed 
against the plaintiff by the male residents were so infused with 
discriminatory bias as to render them pretextual,” and that the doctors had 
reason to “suspect this pretext but[,] nevertheless[,] used these complaints 
as a basis for discharging her from the [p]rogram.”129 
The appellate court found “that there was sufficient evidence in the 
record from which it could be inferred that the atmosphere described by 
the plaintiff was so blatant as to put the defendants on constructive notice 
that sex discrimination permeated the [p]rogram.”130 One of the doctors 
admitted in his deposition that he heard residents and attendings make 
remarks that “women should not be general surgeons.”131 Also, the 
plaintiff spoke with the lead doctors about the dynamics of the program 
including hostility from the male residents toward the women becoming 
doctors.132  Ms. Lipsett further described that the male residents treated her 
with animosity due to her refusal to succumb to their sexual advances.133  
Additionally, Ms. Lipsett told the lead doctor about the harassment.134  
When she was dismissed, this lead doctor even stated that “there was some 
type of behavior that made  . . .  [Ms. Lipsett] uncomfortable.”135 
The court reasoned that “[b]elittling comments about a person’s 
ability to perform on the basis of that person’s sex, are not funny.”136  
Despite the plaintiff’s allegations, the doctors did not take any steps to 
investigate the allegations or resolve them.137  The doctors’ “reliance could 
be characterized as an act of complicity amounting to the ‘supervisory 
encouragement or condonation of or acquiescence in the residents’ 
discriminatory behavior.”138  Therefore, the First Circuit found that these 
facts were true and that the defendants failed to stop or investigate the 
sexual harassment against the plaintiff.139  Ultimately, the First Circuit 
held that there was a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, quid 
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pro quo sexual harassment, actual and constructive knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s allegation of harassment, and a claim of discriminatory 
discharge that could be viewed independently under both Title VII and 
Title IX.140 
The Third Circuit ended the even split and ruled, along with the First 
and Fourth Circuits, that rights under Title VII and Title IX are 
independent from each other and Title IX is not preempted by Title VII.141  
In the Third Circuit, “the [district] courts held conflicting decisions.142  
Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, which discussed whether a 
medical resident alleging sexual harassment and retaliation should be 
treated as: “(i) an employee who can seek relief under Title VII; (ii) a 
student who can seek relief under Title IX; or (iii) both,” resolved the 
conflict.143  Aligning the Third Circuit with the First and Fourth Circuits, 
the court in Doe decided that sexual harassment and retaliation should be 
viewed separately through both Title VII and Title IX.144 
In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., the court decided “whether an 
ex-resident  . . .  can bring private causes of action for sex discrimination 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 
et seq., against Mercy Catholic Medical Center, a private teaching hospital 
operating a residency program.”145  A residency program is “a period of 
clinical didactic and clinical instruction in a medical specialty during 
which physicians prepare for independent practice after graduating from 
medical school.”146  Doe alleged that the director of Mercy’s residency 
program, Dr. James Roe, sexually harassed her and retaliated against her 
because she complained about his behavior, which resulted in her 
dismissal.147  Doe sued Mercy in the district court under Title IX for 
retaliation, quid pro quo harassment, and hostile environment.148  She 
conceded she never filed a charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 with the EEOC.149  The district court held that Title IX does not 
apply to Mercy because it is not an educational program or activity under 
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20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).150  Even if Title IX did apply, the court did not 
believe it could use Title IX to circumvent Title VII’s administrative 
requirements.151 
On appeal, the Third Circuit examined “whether Title IX applies to 
Mercy [and] whether Doe’s private causes of action are cognizable under 
Title IX.”152  First, the Third Circuit considered whether Mercy’s resident 
program made the hospital an “‘educational program or activity’ under 
Title IX.”153  The court discussed that Title IX was enacted under the 
Spending Clause and, therefore, operates like a contract.  Specifically, 
when states accept federal funds, they agree to comply with Title IX’s 
mandate.154  Consequently, if an entity agrees to accept federal funds for 
its educational program or activity, the federal funds may be revoked if 
there is a violation of Title IX.155  The court explained that “Title 
IX’s  . . .  (express) enforcement mechanism is through agencies’ 
regulation of federal funding.156  Unlike the district court which 
differentiated Mercy from an educational program or activity because 
“residents already have a degree, don’t pay tuition, and are paid for their 
services and protected by labor laws,” the court of appeals believed Mercy 
did qualify.157  Because Congress “expressly exempted specific kinds of 
programs from Title IX’s reach[,]  . . .  [the court was] hesitant to impose 
further restrictions without strong justification from Title IX’s text.”158  An 
entity qualifies for federal funding so long as “one can reasonably consider 
its mission to be, at least in part, educational.”159  Because Mercy’s 
residence program was affiliated with Drexel Medicine, a university 
program, the court found it reasonable that Mercy’s mission was 
educational under Title IX.160 
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Furthermore, the court considered whether Doe’s private causes of 
action were cognizable under Title IX.  “Title VII’s concurrent 
applicability does not bar Doe’s private causes of action for retaliation and 
quid pro quo harassment under Title IX.”161  The court of appeals derived 
four guiding principles including (1) “private-sector employees aren’t 
‘limited to Title VII’ in their search for relief from workplace 
discrimination;” (2) “it is a matter of ‘policy’ left for Congress’s 
constitutional purview whether an alternative avenue of relief from 
employment discrimination might undesirably allow circumvention of 
Title VII’s administrative requirements;” (3) “the provision implying Title 
IX’s private cause of action, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), encompasses 
employees, not just students;” and (4) “Title IX’s implied private cause of 
action extends explicitly to employees of federally-funded education 
programs who allege sex-based retaliation claims under Title IX.”162  
Therefore, Doe has a private retaliation claim under Title IX because a 
federal funded recipient, an employee of the residency program, retaliated 
against her for making accusations of sex discrimination.163  
“Whether  . . .  [Doe] could also proceed under Title VII is of no moment” 
because Congress created different remedies that overlap to eradicate 
private sector employment discrimination.164  Therefore, Doe could have 
also proceeded under Title IX for her quid pro quo sexual harassment 
claim.165 
The court ultimately held that Doe’s medical residency program at 
the Mercy Catholic Medical Center hospital, which accepted federal 
funding through Medicare and was affiliated with Drexel University 
Medical Center, qualified as an educational program or activity under Title 
IX.166  Additionally, Doe’s concurrent employee status, which fell under 
Title VII, did not preclude her from bringing a private cause of action 
under Title IX.167  Therefore, the Third Circuit’s holding aligns with the 
First and Fourth Circuit’s decisions that Title VII does not preempt Title 
IX and these claims may be considered independently. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
For decades, there has been a circuit split when a situation with 
alleged discrimination involves education and employment.  After Doe v. 
Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits 
correctly held that both Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 and Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 apply, but the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits found Title VII to preempt Title IX.168  Title IX is substantially 
different from Title VII.169  Title IX does not require a claimant to exhaust 
the administrative remedies first, there is no damages cap, and if a 
violation of Title IX is found, federal agencies have a right to withdraw 
their federal funding to the educational institution.170  Consequently, an 
individual should not be denied the right to bring an independent claim 
under both statutes.171  In order to end the circuit split, the Supreme Court 
of the United States should resolve the issue by allowing a plaintiff to bring 
a discrimination claim with employment and educational attributes under 
both Title VII and Title IX.172  Hopefully, the recent Doe ruling is 
indicative of a new trend and will foster enough conversation to bring this 
issue to the Supreme Court.173 
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